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Structuralism: The Art of the Intelligible, Peter Caws Humanities Press, 1988, 276 pp., $45 cl.  
Throughout this book Peter Caws reminds the reader of the anomalous place that the 
study occupies in relation to intellectual fashions. His book, he suggests, is un timely (think of 
Nietzsche’s Untimely Meditations here) for at least two audiences. The French, he says, after 
having discovered structuralism in the 1950’s and 1960’s, soon passed blithely on to various 
forms of post-structuralism without pausing to see the real strength and scope of what they were 
so eager to surpass. Philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition have, at the other extreme, not 
yet caught up with structuralism and tend to dismiss it as one more trendy import. Caws, whose 
philosophical sympathies are Anglo-American, thinks that the latter have been too slow and 
aloof to recognize a significant intellectual movement while the continentals have been too 
precipitous in attempting to move “beyond” structuralism. My guess is that the book is more 
likely to be successful with the first group than with the second, for its project of systematic 
restatement and critique makes many more gestures toward Russell, Carnap, and Wittgenstein, 
than toward Husserl, Heidegger, and Derrida.   
Structuralism is divided into two parts, the first being an informative overview of 
structuralism in linguistics and the human sciences, the second a critical account of 
“Structuralism as Philosophy” that asks a number of careful questions about meaning, language, 
and system. The tone is often disarmingly light and conversational, and there are enough learned 
apergus to maintain the reader’s engagement even in the more technical reaches of phonetics and 
kinship theory. It is now possible, Caws proposes, to see just what structuralism was up to, and 
he offers a witty, cosmopolitan tour of Saussurean linguistics and the later modifications or 
alternatives proposed by such thinkers as Jakobson and Troubetzkoy. Throughout Caws reminds 
us of the affinities between those thinkers commonly called structuralists and the structural 
motifs or themes to be found in such theorists as Ernst Cassirer, Charles Peirce, and the 
American anthropologist Lewis H. Morgan (whose work was partially absorbed by Marx and 
Engels, providing the grounds for some of the later structuralist appropriations of Marxism). 
Caws offers a clear account of Saussure’s principle that “in language there are only differences 
without positive terms” (73) and goes on to differentiate the forms of structuralist differentiation, 
exhibiting the possibility of a structuralist account of the various aspects or varieties of the 
movement itself. However, this reflexive move is subordinated to the historical narrative which 
is the skeleton of Caws’s account, so that his work embodies some of the same tensions between 
history and structure that provide themes for the structuralists. But the story is an informative one 
and is a good example of what Caws calls “in-struction” in which structures are replicated from 
mind to mind (e.g., 215). Levi-Strauss plays a role in Caws’s reconstruction of anthropolocal 
structuralism that parallels Saussure’s in his account of linguistics; the transformational 
structures of myth and kinship are elucidated carefully, but the master’s presentation is not 
beyond criticism. Caws concludes the more historical part of the book on a provocative note by 
attempting to place deconstruction within the structuralist camp, rather than seeing it as a radical 
alternative. Properly understood, he argues, deconstruction is a response to overinflated claims 
for “absolute structure” (159). It is not an alternative world view, but an imperative to analyze 
our commitment to various structural principles. It is, we might say, the vigilant, critical side of 
structuralism as opposed to its possibility of lapsing into dogmatism.  
The general strategy of the book’s second major section, “Structuralism as Philosophy” is to give 
a critical account of structuralist theory and practice in the light of traditional Anglo-American 
concerns with meaning, representation, human nature and the idealism/realism controversy. 
Caws wants to show that attention to structure or relationality as such is to be found in Russell’s 
theory of relations, Carnap’s notion of the structure of experience, and Wittgenstein’s claim that 
“form is the possibility of structure.” It is not a novel observation that there has been something 
like a linguistic turn in both the English-speaking and the continental philosophical worlds in this 
century, but Caws makes this analogy concrete through his detailed knowledge of both 
traditions. In the spirit of the anglophones, he thinks that we can recognize all the structure we 
want, so long as we do not fall into the error of supposing that it must be part of a global or total 
system. Here the grand enemy of both that tradition and of a self-critical structuralism is what is 
usually called Hegelian idealism. Characteristically Caws’s example of such a totalistic system 
comes from a late American follower of the absolute idealists, Brand Blanshard. In a detailed 
criticism of Blanshard’s position, Caws shows some sympathy for his concern with intelligible 
structure but he thinks that we can stop short of Blanshard’s goal of finding necessity within a 
system and settle for the more modest structuralist aim of accommodating what is to be 
understood within an intelligible system (208). This leads to a consideration of the idealist side 
of absolute idealism. Both Blanshard and the structuralists lapse too easily into one or another 
variety of idealism, Caws claims. But structures can be acknowledged on a materialist basis, and 
in fact Caws thinks that the structuralists have given us no reason to doubt materialism; that is, 
they have given us no reason to doubt that “the life of thought is embedded inextricably in a 
context of materiality” (245). Finally Caws would like to call his position “structuralist 
materialism” (252).  
This book will provide an excellent introduction to structuralism for anyone who has 
been waiting for a guide relatively free of French or German philosophical commitments. The 
first part of the book might very well serve as a secondary text in an advanced undergraduate 
course that also wanted to grapple with some Saussure and Levi-Strauss. The second part could 
also be read, but because it engages with a particular series of issues that are most germane to the 
Anglo- American tradition, a truly catholic treatment of the subject would do well to include 
more recent continental responses to structuralism, from such writers as Jacques Derrida and 
Manfred Frank.  
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